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Abstract 
This study aims at explaining property right changes in selected areas of Afar region in 
Ethiopia. Based on primary and secondary data, explanations are given on the existing types 
of land use arrangements and how the traditional communal rights of pastoralists have been 
changing. Both communal rights and individualized rights exist the latter being introduced 
with the establishment of commercial farms. The state is identified as one driving force 
behind property right changes especially in one study site (Ambash), which is suitable for 
irrigated agriculture whereas its direct intervention is minimal in other sites. The coercive 
interventions started in 1960s have had detrimental impacts on the livelihoods of pastoral 
households. In addition to the state as a change agent, natural as well as socioeconomic 
challenges are important in explaining the current changes in land use arrangements.  
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1 Introduction 
Property rights are the most influential institutions in livelihoods of societies. The word 
“right” is closely attached with everyday human life; the right to use a resource, the right to 
transfer it, the right to exclude others, and even beyond physical resources, the right to 
express one’s own views, the right to get respect, etc. While one’s quality of life is directly 
affected by resource endowments, property rights define how existing resources are utilized, 
who should utilize what attributes of the resource, and so on.  
While discussing about property rights at least two issues are worth considering. First, 
property rights vary spatially depending upon socioeconomic, political and natural 
circumstances. Even within a certain geographical confinement, there may exist multiple 
forms or layers of property rights the combinations of which are subjected to change over 
time. On the one hand, the existence of “hybrid” or “mixtures” of property rights can be seen 
as an advantage because individuals can choose one or another of these frameworks as the 
basis for their claims (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). By having such an opportunity they 
can enjoy benefits which otherwise may not be realized. The existence of multiple layers or 
“bundles” of rights may also enable communities to withstand natural challenges such as 
drought. Pastoral areas are apt examples. On the other hand, the existence of multiple 
property rights, can invite conflicts among different actors as overlapping claims may arise 
(Di Gregorio et al. 2004). Particularly when certain forms of property rights are introduced 
intentionally through coercive measures, the conflicts may be so serious to the extent that they 
cause losses of assets.    
Second, property rights adjust overtime. The adjustments may occur in response to the 
changing opportunities (arising from markets, technology, and the like) or demographic 
changes (Demsetz 1967; Behnke 1985; Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Ruttan 1989). It’s also not 
uncommon to observe changes in property rights as a result of changes in national political 
system or ideological dynamism (Ensminger and Rutten 1991; Hanisch 2003). In such cases, 
property rights are intentionally designed rather than evolving over time. While different 
factors may trigger property right changes, this dynamic process proceeds not in a smooth 
way in which every economic actor endorses each and every event of the process. Rather, the 
process involves, perhaps, a series of conflicts among different actors having different 
bargaining power (Knight 1992, Wang 2001), arising from their heterogeneity in action 
resources. As a result, the emerging property rights would have different, perhaps 
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contradictory, meanings for different actors. For those “strong” actors the emergence of new 
property rights may be taken as a window of opportunity to utilize existing resources more 
optimally whereas for the “weak” actors, it is a challenge hampering success in livelihoods.  
Traditionally pastoral areas are governed by common property regime. This traditional 
system of resource use arrangement has evolved spontaneously to suit the ecological 
conditions of the pastoral milieu (Ensminger and Rutten 1991).  However, nowadays the 
traditional pastoral property rights have been changing either spontaneously in response to 
new opportunities or challenges or intentionally mainly driven by external agents or a mixed 
factors (Behnke 1985; Grell and Kirk 1999; Swallow and Kamara 1999; Thebaud and 
Batterbury 2001). Ethiopian pastoralists are not exceptional in this regard.  
Property rights are so fundamental to functioning of traditional as well as advanced 
economies that any knowledge we can garner regarding how they change or do not is 
beneficial. Studying changes in pastoral property rights is important because: (1) it indicates 
how different user groups reacted to the changes and the distributional impacts of those 
changes, (2) it helps to draw lessons from past interventions that brought property right 
changes so that appropriate policies will be designed in the future to improve livelihoods in 
pastoral areas, and (3) it helps to explain how current theoretical debates on property right 
changes fit to empirical settings. This is the first motive for this study. The second motive is 
related with the relatively limited research focus in Afar. That is, the existing studies on 
pastoral property rights concentrate in the southern region while the Afar, the third largest 
pastoral region in the country, has got little research focus. For instance, a selected annotated 
bibliography compiled by Luiseno, Swallow and Kamara (1998), indicates that out of 49 
pastoral related literature focusing on Ethiopia, 26 are specifically the outputs of studies in 
southern Ethiopia (particularly the Borana plateau) whereas no study has been cited in this 
document which target Afar pastoralists.  A few studies discussing specific issues on Afar 
may be found (e.g. Getachew 2001; Ali 1997) and, in general, Afar has been given, if any, 
sub topics in comprehensive studies about pastoralism.  
The paper focuses on two aspects. First, it shades light on the existing traditional forms of 
property rights in selected areas of Afar. Based on the discussions made with different 
pastoral groups and key informants (such as elders), a brief description has been provided on 
what forms of resource use arrangements are available in the areas and how resources are 
governed. Second, the paper examines the current changes in customary rights of pastoralists 
and the driving forces for the changes. More specifically, explanations are provided on how 
state intervention in favor of agricultural production started about four decades ago brought 
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changes in customary pastoral rights in the Middle Awash Valley and pinpoint the 
implications of the changes to the livelihoods of pastoral households. In so doing, the existing 
theoretical explanations of property right changes have been traced which may provide a case 
on the applicability of contemporary theories of institutional change to the context of 
pastoralism. In addition to the state as a change agent, the contributions of natural and socio-
economic factors to property right changes have been discussed.  
The remainder of the paper contains five sections. Section 2 discusses some concepts of 
property rights. Section 3 extends a similar issue but focuses on theoretical explanations of 
property right changes. Section 4 introduces the study areas and data sources. Section 5 
discusses forms of property rights in the study areas and contemporary changes. The last 
section provides some conclusions from the research. 
2 Concepts of Property Rights 
A number of definitions are provided in the literature of property rights. While some are quite 
interrelated others vary depending upon the purpose of the analysis. According to Bromley 
property rights are the capacity to call up on a collective or some higher body (usually a state) 
to protect one’s claim (Bromley 1991; 1992; 2001). Similarly, Wiber (1992) defined property 
rights as ‘claims to use or control resources by an individual or group that are recognized as 
legitimate by a larger collectivity and that are protected through law’. Another definition 
comes from Alchian (1987) which considers property rights as ‘the ability to enjoy a piece of 
a property’ which Barzel (1997) designates as “economic rights”. Barzel (1997) makes a 
distinction between economic rights and “legal rights” the latter being what a state assigns to 
a person or an entity.   
Property rights refer to a “bundle” of rights those individuals or groups have on a certain 
material or intellectual resource (Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Alchian and Demsetz 1973). 
These bundles of rights include the right to derive benefits from the resource, the right to 
exclude others, the right to manage the resource (including the right to change its form and 
location), and the right to transfer the resource to others through various arrangements 
(Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Bromley 1991; Agrawal and Ostrom 1999). The rights may be 
time-bounded or intermittent. An individual or a group may enjoy all of these bundles of 
rights or some of them.   
Three concepts worth noting in Bromley’s (1991) definition of property rights are: right 
holders, benefit streams, and duty bearers. Right holders are claimants over a resource, which 
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could be individuals, communities, or entities having legal personality. In most cases, there 
exist conflicts among different individuals or communities regarding who should command 
over a resource, how to use a resource, when to use it, and so on. There are a great number of 
cases in which different people or communities bear overlapping claims over resources.  
Bromley (1992) perceives the word “property” as a secured1 claim to a benefit (or income) 
stream. The benefits could be of various characteristics i.e. material or spiritual, long-term or 
short term, subtractable or non-subtractable, excludable or non-excludable, tradable or non-
tradable and so on. According to Barzel (1997), a physical asset (e.g. land) has a number of 
economic attributes to which different entities have ownership rights (economic rights). He 
posits that the ability to receive the income flow generated by an asset in line with any of its 
attributes constitutes part of the property rights over that asset. For example, a herder group 
drawing benefits from a certain rangeland by negotiating with de jure or customary owners is 
a property right holder vis-à-vis that specific resource attribute. This implies that the ultimate 
interest of the rights holder or a claimant is not in a resource system per se but in the flow (or 
stock) of benefits that the resource system generates. Therefore, all negotiations regarding the 
type of rights that the claimant wants to be entitled in a resource take account of specific types 
of benefit units generated.  
While rights imply the access of right holders to benefit streams, they do not guarantee the 
realization of benefits. Ribot and Peluso (2003) made this distinction by providing a broader 
framework of property right analysis. The basic idea of their framework is the distinction it 
makes between “property” from “access”. Accordingly, ‘access is about all possible means by 
which a person is able to benefit from things’ while ‘property generally evokes some kind of 
socially acknowledged and supported claims or rights’ (ibid, pp. 155, emphasis original) In so 
doing, they showed how capability differences arising from access to different resources 
influence benefits generated from resources. 
3 Dynamism in Property Rights 
3.1 General Debates 
As any other institutions, property rights are dynamic in nature and change in response to 
various circumstances. While the dynamism of property rights is an acceptable fact, there 
exists extensive theoretical debate observed in property right literature regarding the 
                                                 
1  It is worthwhile to note that there is no property in open access situation as no one’s claim is secured. 
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substantive cause of property rights change. Three schools are dominant in the contemporary 
theoretical debates regarding property right changes namely, the efficiency school, the 
distribution school and the political economy school (Hanisch 2003). Proponents of the 
efficiency school argue that property rights are human artifacts that change to enable the 
society exploit ever-changing opportunities (Demsetz 1967; Behnke 1985; Hayami and 
Ruttan 1985; Ruttan 1989; Barzel 1997). When the existing property rights are found to 
hamper benefits from new opportunities a need arises from economic actors to replace old 
rules with the new ones; and this will ultimately bring an overall economic efficiency 
improvement.  
Despite their wide ranging explanations, the efficiency view failed to explain the role of 
economic actors in property right changes. Changes in relative factor prices may provide 
partial explanations to property right changes. For instance, the idea of relative price changes 
leading to changes in property rights is often modified by factors external to the domestic 
market (Joireman 2000; Platteau 1996). It is not uncommon to observe intentionally designed 
property right arrangements, perhaps due to state intervention. Of course, some proponents of 
the economic view also admit that the process of institutional change is not as smooth as one 
may expect (e.g. Hayami and Ruttan 1985). Indeed, the divergence of interests of the society 
and the government officials may curb the evolution process or shift the direction of the 
change. Therefore, to understand the change of property rights, we need to know how 
economic actors, interact in the real world.  
Emphasizing the role of economic actors, proponents of the distribution school argue that 
efficiency improvements, which the efficiency school envisages, can be impeded by 
distributional inequality (Libecap 1989; Knight 1992; Wang 2001). As Knight (1992) argues 
changes in institutions (including property rights) involve continuous bargaining among 
actors in the social system. As these actors obviously vary in action resources (or bargaining 
savvy), reflecting different bargaining positions, the impact of the resulting institutions would 
be different for different actors.  In the same vein, Wang (2001) argues that property rights 
emerge under conflicting situations, which may not result in Pareto optimal conditions. 
Rather, some actors lose while others gain from the process. This distributive nature of 
property right changes invites different conflicting responses from different actors. In deed, 
those losers may take measures to block the change as far as those measures are not too costly 
to them. On the contrary, it is equally likely that actors expecting some gain from the changes 
put their pressure in order to realize their goal. Thus, it is the interplay of the powers of 
different economic actors, which determine the final direction of the change.  
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The third sort of explanation for property right change takes the form of political economy. 
In this perspective, the state is considered as the powerful actor to bring formal institutional 
changes through its political institutions (McChesney 2003; Hanisch 2003; Bardhan 2005; 
Ensminger and Rutten 1991). In doing so, the state may not guarantee the realization of 
property right changes that fulfill Pareto optimal conditions, as supposed by the efficiency 
school. In the neoclassical world, where economists are supposed to be behind the 
promulgation and implementation of the so-called “first best policies” (Dixit 1996), the 
condition of optimality may be fulfilled. However, the choice of the “first best policy” doesn’t 
necessarily imply the incentives and costs of politicians involved in policy making (Hanisch 
2003) while it tells much on economic advantages of adopting a given policy. The Public 
Choice perspective, gives much room to political dimensions of institutional changes. 
Accordingly, political power is granted from the public to political agents based on the policy 
agendas and institutional changes that the agents announce during election periods. 
Theoretically, in this framework, institutional choices (including property rights) are made 
directly by voters or through their elected representatives whereas the state, as an ensemble of 
different public sections, ensures the realization of the desired institutional change. In 
practice, however, divergences between public interests and institutional change exist due to 
the imperfection of the real “political market”2. The imperfection of the political market is 
primarily related with the short-term rent maximizing behavior of political agents. In other 
words, political agents are not so benign to enforce the desired institutional change 
particularly when the anticipated change reduces their economic rent. 
The state is not a black box in public-choice theory, but an active and a ‘giant’ actor in the 
economy directed by political agents. Thus, the state is considered to be a player, but one with 
an explicit goal of maximizing its own revenue. However, revenue maximization is not the 
only agenda behind the motive of the state to pursue institutional change. For instance, 
ideological motives dominate state proposals for institutional change (Joerman 2000; Hanisch 
2003). When ideological motives dominate, state induced institutional changes may take a 
revolutionary path to bring radical changes. While many of the ideology-based interventions 
were meant to solve equity problems (e.g. state actions in former socialist countries) there is 
still no guarantee that such interventions mitigate efficiency problems.  
                                                 
2  The principals (the public) do not surely know whether politicians are committed to deliver the public goods, 
which the former primarily voted for.  
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3.2 Driving Forces 
The interaction of various actors, individuals or organizations, are in response to new 
economic opportunities (such as domestic as well as global market opportunities, changes in 
global economic order) and challenges (population pressure, climatic changes). When the 
state enters as a giant actor, ideological considerations are also worth noting. While some of 
these factors cause gradual and spontaneous emergence of property rights (partially or entirely 
replacing the existing ones) others result in rapid replacements of new property right 
arrangements. In other words, some are evolutionary in nature while others are revolutionary. 
In his well-known thesis Demsetz (1967) posits that the emergence of new property rights 
takes place in response to rise in demand of the target resources. Based on the memoir of 
Eleanor Leacock3, he explains how property rights change from open access, where every one 
can harvest the resource without limit, to private property as a result of changes in demand for 
fur. Moreover, according to Demsetz, new property rights emerge when the gains of 
internalizing the externalities of the current arrangements exceed the costs of internalization. 
In the same vein, Behnke (1985) testifies the spontaneous emergence of property rights 
through empirical analysis that shows how land tenure systems change over time in response 
to new technical and commercial factors in pastoral contexts of Sudan.   
While property rights have substantial influence on the generation and dissemination of 
technologies they may also shape some changes in the social and economic environment of 
people. In other words, the introduction of certain type of technology may entail the 
emergence of certain type of property rights. A well-known theory of induced institutional 
innovation envisages that technological change takes the direction of changes in relative 
factor prices (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Ruttan 1989). The theory posits that technological 
development goes in conformity with the configurations and relative endowments of various 
resources, whereas institutions are shaped to enable communities take advantage of emerging 
opportunities over time.   
A number of literature indicate that population pressure induces a gradual change in 
property rights (Boserup 1965; Bromley 1991; Madulu 2005). In her seminal work, Boserup 
(1965) explains how population pressure results in different intensification levels in Southeast 
Asia. While testifying the responses of technology and production techniques to population 
pressure, her analysis implicitly shows how property rights change overtime from a kind of 
                                                 
3  Eleanor Leacock, American Anthropologist (American Anthropological Asso.), Vol. 56, No. 5, Part 2, 
Memoir No. 78. 
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open access where everyone has unlimited access to land (for example in a system of shifting 
cultivation) to an individualized property right system where everyone has a fixed plot of land 
to command on or cultivate. Bromley (1991) posits that property rights change with resources 
gradually moving from open access, to state property, to common property and eventually to 
private property with population growth and increased commercialization. Studies in pastoral 
contexts indicate that land conflicts in Africa deal with farmers’ encroachment on pastoral 
lands partly attributable to the population pressure among farming communities (Peperkamp 
1986). Likewise, Wede (1987) and Staar (1986) argue that population pressure and reduced 
soil fertility caused the expansion of farmlands to pastoral areas and hence caused conflicts 
between pastoralists and sedentary farmers (or agro-pastoralists). 
Another important cause for gradual change in property rights is climatic changes. This is 
particularly important for arid and semi-arid areas where persistent drought is a big challenge 
to human well being. Swallow and Kamara (1999) indicate that ‘drought conditions increase 
the relative scarcity value of resources that produce relatively reliable outputs’. They posit 
that conversion of land from common to private property is most likely to occur during 
droughts although drought induced conversion is likely to be socially inefficient. Likewise, a 
study conducted in southern Ethiopia, show that climatic conditions are behind the changes in 
customary pastoral land rights (Kamara 1999). Furthermore, Thebaud and Batterbury (2001) 
indicate that pastoral societies, responding to drought and to the historic spread of agricultural 
frontier, started to exercise farming in different forms.  
Donor influence on property rights is well discussed by Grell and Kirk (1999). They 
indicate that donors may exert their pressure at different levels or scales. The so called ‘big 
donors’ like the World Bank can influence property rights through their influence on national 
or sectoral policies and strategies or they may impose their interests at grassroots levels 
through ‘donor-driven’ NGOs. Empirical evidences also show that the activities of NGOs 
have significant effects on property rights and land-use changes (Swallow and Kamara 1999).  
4 The Study Sites and Research Methods 
4.1 The Afar Region and the Study Sites 
The Afar Region is located in northeastern part of Ethiopia sharing international border with 
Eritrea and Djibouti. In terms of area coverage the Afar region is the fourth largest with a total 
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area of 100,860 square km and is structured into 5 zones and 29 woredas4. The population 
size is 1,216,000 as of July 2000 of which about 92% live in rural areas while the remaining 
dwell in truck-stop urban centers. The rural residents are pastoralists, predominantly 
exercising transhumance pastoralism with crop cultivation in a few locations. The Afar 
pastoralists raise mixed species of primary livestock, including camels and cattle and keep 
supplementary herds of goats and sheep usually for commercial purpose. 
The topography of the region varies from hilly escarpments in the western and southern 
edges (with an altitude range of 1,000-1,500 meters) to lowland plains in the northeast that 
fall below sea level up to 100 meters. The climate of the region is arid and hot with annual 
rainfall ranging from about 225 mm to 561 mm and temperature from 180c to 450c (and even 
higher in some areas). The northern part of Afar region, around the lower Danakil plain, is 
predominantly a semi-desert with thorny species of shrubs and acacia, which have developed 
dwarf forms and is not as such suitable for livestock production. The middle part of the region 
is characterized by arid climate where pastoralists are more mobile. In the southern part, the 
density of pastoralists is relatively high as this area is better in pastoral resources.  
Three districts (woredas) namely, Awash Fentale, Amibara and Semu Robi, have been 
covered in this study all of which are found in the southern and southwestern parts of Afar 
region. Two sites were selected purposively from each district in such a way that the sample 
reflects some diversity in resource endowments and use patterns, inter-ethnic relationships, 
state-pastoralist relations, and the like. Accordingly, four of the study sites, namely Ambash, 
Kurkura, Doho and Dudub, are found in the southern part of the region, located in the middle 
Awash valley. These are riverine areas where irrigated state-owned and private farms are 
located. Apart from the commercial farms pastoral households engage in crop production in 
some sites such as Ambash and Doho. These four sites share boundaries with Karrayou (an 
Oromo clan) in the east and southeast, with Issa (a Somali clan) in the north and northeast and 
Argoba in the southwest. The other two sites, Harihammo and Daleti, are located across the 
southwestern escarpments bordering the Amhara region. No extensive commercial farm exists 
in these sites but pastoral households practice opportunistic farming5 in some pocket areas 
                                                 
4  Woreda refers to an administrative unit next to regional states in government hierarchy. Four levels of 
administrative units exist in Ethiopia each having its own council of public representatives namely: the 
federal state, the regional states, woredas and kebeles from top to down. 
5  Here opportunistic farming refers to intermittent cultivation undertaken when rainfall is forecasted to be 
adequate for crop production.  
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where the rainfall pattern allows them to do so. The Amharas (west and southwest) and the 
Oromos (northwest) are the neighbors of Afar pastoralists in these areas. 
4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The study is based on both primary and secondary data. The primary data have been collected 
from individual households and focused groups. After selecting the sites (with the help of 
local experts), two steps have been used to identify the sample pastoralists. First, using lists of 
household heads in each village (generated for the purpose of this study), pastoral households 
were stratified into three groups (poor, medium, and better off) with the help of the local 
elders. Thereafter, approximately equal sample size was randomly drawn from each stratum 
totaling 180 households. A group of trained enumerators conducted the interviews with 
individual sample households guided by a structured questionnaire prepared for this purpose. 
In addition to questionnaire-based interviews, a series of discussions were held with elders 
and key informants prior, as well as parallel, to the household survey. A wide range of data 
were collected on resource ownership and use, decision powers, resource sharing systems and 
property rights, perception on current resource use and ownership, future demands regarding 
resource use and ownership, and the like. Moreover, secondary data sources have been 
explored to supplement the primary data. These include district pastoral development offices, 
state farms, concerned offices of the regional and federal governments, and NGOs.   
Descriptions and explanations have been given on the types of property rights as well as 
causes and consequences of property right changes based on the qualitative data generated 
through discussions with various pastoral groups and secondary sources. Based on a brief 
narration, arguments have been made taking into account contemporary theories of property 
right changes.  
5 Property Rights in the Study Areas: Forms and Changes 
5.1 Forms of Property Rights 
Property rights in Afar are based on the existing pastoral philosophy in which land belongs to 
community members defined by sanguinity or other social ties. Accordingly, clan is the 
lowest social unit to which communal property rights over land and other natural resources 
are defined. In principle, Afarland is equally divided among all clans of Afar whereas indeed 
the distribution depends upon resource potentials and the dominance of a clan (either in 
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number or political power). Each clan has its own territory, i.e. every member of a clan can 
tell where the boundary of his ‘home land’ is. The boundaries are usually marked by some 
physical objects such as mountains, rivers and bare-land. Actually, the boundaries tell only 
control rights (exclusion, alienation and management rights) of a clan, while mobility 
transcends clan territories. Based on the customary institutions, every member of the clan, by 
default, has the right to use the fruits of his clan’s land once he has the livestock to utilize the 
resources. 
Clan land often comprises strategic resource such as grazing areas including dry season 
retreats, browsing resources, and water points. In addition, each clan has also communal 
graveyards, settlement areas (metaro) and ritual sites. Each clan has a well-established 
gerontocracy where the decision power regarding land and other natural resources rests on the 
village council, consisting of the clan leader, elders, the feima6 and local wise-men. The 
decisions given to the village council include exclusion of non-members, allocation of sites to 
non-members and determining resource use pattern.  
Table 1: Perception of the Sample Pastoralists regarding Who Decides on Land Matters. 
Percent (number) of respondents  
Traditional Council Kebele Council 
Ambash 100 (30) 60 (18) 
Kurkura 90 (27) 53.3 (16) 
Dudub 89.7 (26) 44.8 (13) 
Doho 96.6 (28) 58.6 (17) 
Daleti 44.8 (13) 100 (29) 
Harihammo 60 (18) 100 (30) 
Source: survey data 
As indicated in Table 1, most of the sample pastoralists believe that the decision power on 
land matters rests on the traditional council. Nevertheless, the respondents in two of the study 
sites namely Harihammo and Daleti, have a different perception. In these sites, all of the 
respondents perceive that local government council (the kebele council) decide on land 
matters while less than fifty percent of them have indicated that the traditional council has 
also some power. This could imply either the weakening of the traditional decision body or its 
integration into the modern administrative structure due to the intervention of the state. 
                                                 
6  Feima is a body, which is responsible for rule enforcement. 
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Whereas the perceptions of the respondents in other four sites confirm that traditional 
councils have the de facto power on land matters. 
Four categories of land are clearly observed vis-à-vis the bundles of rights that members 
enjoy (see Figure 1). For the sake of convenience, they are termed in this paper as primary 
communal land (A and B), secondary communal land (C), tertiary communal land (D) and 
individual land (A). The arrows in the figure imply the possibility of movement for pastoral 
groups in all directions and categories of land use arrangement. The breadth, duration and 
assurance of rights decline as one moves from the first category through to the third one. A 
primary communal land, also locally known as waamo, refers to the land over which a clan 
has use rights as well as exclusion rights. Moreover, waamo rights entitle a clan (or a lineage) 
to alienate resources within a specified territory. Each clan manages its resources collectively 
based on customary principles. Accordingly, herd management follows rotational grazing. 
When rainfall is normal for successive seasons, clan members are communicated not to use 
reserve pasture areas. These areas are accessible to the members after assessing that other 
areas are exhaustively used. Although each clan member has an inalienable use right over the 
resources, intra-clan customary laws bind his/her use rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Schematic Description of Land Use Rights and Pastoral Action Space 
Source: own figure 
Secondary communal land refers to the vast area to which clan members have only access 
rights encompassing all migration routes during normal as well as drought years. These 
D 
C 
B 
A 
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resource sharing arrangements maintain the priority use rights for the owners while allowing 
access by other pastoralists in accordance with strict rules aimed at controlling and managing 
pastoral resources. On the basis of long-term reciprocity principle, each Afar clan is entitled 
to secondary communal rights over other clan’s land. Hence, negotiation may not be strictly 
required to access the pasture once agreements are established. However, the secondary right 
holders need to respect the customary laws of the owners to exercise their right. For instance, 
they are not allowed to cut trees or allow other herders to use. Moreover, the entire clan land 
is not usually open for the guest herders. It is a common practice that specific corners, such as 
settlement sites, ritual sites, reserve pasturelands, and farmlands, are protected from outsiders. 
These secondary rights, also known as isso rights, allow consistent seasonal migration 
patterns and resource sharing during normal and drought years.  
During a prolonged drought, which is common nowadays, pastoralists in the study areas 
migrate to distant places controlled by other ethnic groups such as Oromo, Amhara, and 
Argoba once informal assessment has been made for the existence of adequate pasture and 
browse. In this case, negotiation is strictly required. If negotiation is successful, the new 
comers are allowed to use the grazing and browsing resources for some time depending upon 
the condition of the resources and climatic situations. Perhaps, the guest herders are required 
to abide by the customary rules of the host group. Such types of rights are termed here as 
tertiary communal rights. In most cases, agreements for tertiary rights are made between 
ethnically distant groups and hence personal networks help to succeed. For example, an 
individual who has marriage relationship with a member of the host clan may get preferential 
treatment to use the pasture.   
The forth category of land includes specific sites operated by individuals for production of 
crops. Apart from communal rights, some households are entitled to private land to produce 
various types of crops. In this case, the right holders enjoy not only the right to use the 
resource but also the right to exclude other clan members. The bundles of rights on the 
individual plots include also alienation rights although the latter is limited (in extent) to the 
transfer of land through inheritance or as a gift to clan members.  
The extent of individual holdings varies across locations. In Ambash, the percent of sample 
pastoralists enjoying private rights is the highest of all target sites. Here more than two-third 
of the respondents are entitled to at least one hectare of farmland (Table 2). In Doho, 
Harihammo and Daleti, closer to 50 percent of the sample pastoralists have exclusionary 
rights over individual plots. The least in terms of the individual holdings (and hence least in 
sub-division of communal land) are Dudub and Kurkura. The latter two areas are relatively 
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less suitable for crop production; neither rain is sufficient nor irrigable river is available in 
these sites.   
Table 2: Do you have private plot of land? 
Location Per cent (number) of “yes” responses 
Ambash 70.0(21) 
Kurkura 6.7(2) 
Doho 46.7(14) 
Dudub 3.3(1) 
Harihammo 46.7(14) 
Daleti 44.8(13) 
All sites 36.3(65) 
Source: survey data 
 
5.2 Triggers and Motivations for Property Right Changes 
5.2.1. The Role of the State as a ‘Giant Actor’ 
In this section the role of the state in introducing and enforcing property right changes in the 
study areas will be discussed. There exists a wide variation among the selected study sites 
with respect to the level of state intervention. In Ambash, the extent of state intervention has 
been high while in other sites (although farming exists), the role of the state has been 
minimal. Hence, the discussion will be made under two sub-topics with the main focus on the 
state-driven property right changes in Ambash.  
5.2.1.1 The Role of the State in Ambash 
Generally speaking, the intervention of the state in Afar was very limited prior to the 1960s. 
Farming was also limited to the lower Awash flood-fed plains where the Aussa clan, the royal 
clan of the Aussa Sultanate, had been practicing a mixed crop-livestock farming for 
generations (Getachew 2001). However, after 1960s government interventions in these areas 
have increased. The rise in government interventions, in fact, was part of much broader 
development strategies that most developing countries adopted during the 1950s and the 
1960s. Taking into account the global economic order of the time, the Imperial government in 
Ethiopia designed an industry-focused economic development strategy. Expansion of large-
scale commercial farming was taken as a means to supply raw materials to domestic 
industries as well as to produce surplus food for factory laborers. While pursuing extensive 
land to locate the envisaged commercial farms, the Afar plains were among the areas that 
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attracted the attention of the designers of the strategy. Some 70,000 ha of the dry-season 
grazing areas of the Afars were selected in the middle and lower Awash valley and put into 
large-scale irrigation in late 1960s (ibid). Because of its suitability for irrigated agriculture, 
Ambash was among those areas that received much attention of government officials. The 
Middle Awash Agricultural Development Enterprise (MAADE) was established in 1968 
under auspice of the Awash Valley Authority (AVA), which had been established earlier by 
decree on January 23, 1962. That is, AVA is an agent of institutional change that took several 
responsibilities including establishment of state farms through negotiation with the local 
people, coordination and financing of settlement and other schemes, and monitoring of the 
proposed changes. After the collapse of the Imperial regime in 1974, MAADE was expanded 
from 300 ha in 1968 to 13,116 ha in 1985 by clearing more land from dry-season grazing sites 
(MAADE unpublished document).  
From the point of the theories of institutional change, the emergence of new property rights 
in Ambash can be thought as a result of strategic conflict between AVA (the state 
functionary) and the local people over the benefits generated from land. As Knight (1992: 
126) posits ‘social institutions are a by-product of strategic conflict over substantive social 
outcomes’.  Accordingly, he argues, ‘economic actors produce institutions in the process of 
seeking distributional advantage in the conflict over substantive benefits’ (p. 126). Getting 
back to the specific case of Ambash, conflicts arise because both AVA and the local people 
claim for the same resource (land) while different institutions back these claims.  AVA strives 
to enforce its de jure rights based on statutory laws. The ideological basis for this claim is that 
the state rather than the community is the origin of ownership and title (Bruce 1989; Ribot 
and Peluso 2003). It is also commonly presumed that the state has stronger enforcement 
power to secure rights, enhance sustainable resource management, and improve social 
welfare. On the contrary, the demand of the local people is to retain their customary rights. 
The claim of the local people emanates from the fact that each clan of Afar has been 
managing and protecting its own inherited land from outsiders for generations. The legitimacy 
and logic of this claim has got both theoretical and empirical support from scholars studying 
common-pool resources and common property regimes (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 2002; 
Meinzen-Dick and Knox 1999). Therefore, we have two conflicting demands here: 
introducing new property right arrangements, favored by AVA, and maintaining the status 
quo, desired by the local people. On the one hand, the design was to put some part of the land 
under strict state ownership where the state derives direct benefits through the establishment 
of three state farms. On the other hand, the aim was to introduce individual ownerships 
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through settler farm schemes. Both of these plans are in contradiction with the previous de 
facto rights, in which the local people had communal rights over the existing resources.  
How do contemporary theories of institutional change explain this phenomenon? In the 
following few paragraphs, I will focus on how the interaction between these two actors, AVA 
and the local people, resulted in new property right arrangements taking the bargaining theory 
of institutional change into consideration. The bargaining theory of institutional change 
emphasizes the role of bargaining power in institutional transformation (Knight 1992). Power 
is defined here as the capacity of an actor to constrain others’ strategy. 
We have two actors here, AVA and the local people striving for their strategic advantage. 
Our case represents a situation in which AVA is more powerful than the local people. AVA’s 
power arises from the fact that it has more financial, human and material resources, which 
help it to constrain the preferred strategy of the local people. For instance, by using its 
financial resources, AVA could finance the settlement farms from which the local people 
derived benefits. Moreover, by using financial and material resources, AVA could divide the 
local people by attracting some elites. In addition to financial and other resources, AVA had 
military support from the government to enforce the new orders.  
Table 3: Bargaining Game between Pastoralists and AVA   
  AVA 
  Status quo Change 
Pastoralists Status quo (Xss, Yss) (Xsc, Ysc) 
 Change (Xcs, Ycs) (Xcc, Ycc) 
Source: own presentation 
The situation can be discussed with the help of a simple non-cooperative game where each 
player has a specified payoff for selecting a given strategy. The payoffs are shown in Table 3 
in a general form and the terms are defined as follows: (1) Xss = the net benefit of pastoralists 
(as a group) when status quo is maintained while AVA plays the same strategy. This is 
equivalent to the total benefits of the pastoralists if the land is used for livestock production 
minus the costs associated with it. (2) Yss = the net benefit of AVA (the state) under the 
status quo while the pastoralists play status quo. Perhaps, this is equivalent to the total tax 
revenue from the pastoral land use without direct involvement of the state in commercial 
farming. (3) Xcs = the net benefit of pastoralists if they go for property right change without 
the intervention of AVA (i.e. when AVA plays status quo). (4) Ycs = the net benefit of AVA 
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if it plays status quo while pastoralists pursue change. (5) Xcc = the net benefit of pastoralists 
if AVA introduces the proposed change with their agreement. This includes the benefits 
associated with settlements farms, employment opportunities in the commercial farms, the 
livestock development project intended to make the existing livestock production more 
market-oriented, and other incentives while taking account of the opportunity cost of the land 
expropriated by AVA. (6) Ycc = the net benefit of AVA if change would be introduced while 
the pastoralists pursue change.  This includes the total net proceeds derived from the state 
farms minus the costs incurred to run settlement farms and other schemes for the displaced 
pastoralists. (7) Xsc = the net benefit of pastoralists if they play status quo while AVA 
enforces change. This is equivalent to Xcc minus the costs incurred by pastoralists to resist 
AVA’s actions (or maintain status quo). (8) Ysc = the net benefit of AVA when it plays 
change while pastoralists demand status quo. This is equivalent to Ycc minus the cost 
incurred by AVA to control the resistance of pastoralists and sustain the new property right. 
Assuming the principles of rational choice to hold, voluntary change could be possible 
when the anticipated benefit from the new proposal is satisfactory from the viewpoint of both 
actors. From the side of the pastoralists, this could be possible if: Xcc - Xss > θ > 0, where θ 
is the minimum benefit that makes pastoralists to accept the proposed change. In other words, 
θ refers to the opportunity cost of the pastoralists for adopting the new change. It may also 
include the notion about fairness and justice as perceived by the pastoralists. Likewise, for 
AVA it would be rational to proceed with the change if Ycc - Yss > β > 0, where β is the 
minimum benefit from the proposed change to be acceptable to AVA given the investment 
costs and risks associated with the new venture.  
In the context of power symmetry, any proposed change occurs when the two actors have 
similar demands regarding the implementation of the change i.e. when at least the threshold 
levels (θ and β) are met for both actors. However, when power asymmetry exists or when the 
bargaining ground is not leveled, change can be introduced as far as the powerful actor is 
capable of imposing the new change through the offer of a reward, the threat of penalty, or 
combination of threat and an offer7. Virtually, the mechanism by which AVA’s power 
through threat and offer influences the decision of the pastoralists to accept or reject the 
proposal is in its effect on the credibility of the commitments in the bargaining interaction. In 
selecting their strategy, therefore, the local people need to evaluate the credibility of AVA’s 
commitments and capability in enforcing the proposed change. This credibility depends up on 
                                                 
7  The latter has been termed as “throffer” by Taylor 1982.  
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AVA’s power as perceived by the local people. There is sufficient reason for the local people 
to believe that AVA would enforce the change. First, they expect that AVA has adequate 
financial, material and human resources to establish the commercial farms and settlement 
farms. Second, given their poverty and numerousness, they may foresee their vulnerability to 
AVA’s “divide-and-rule” strategy. Third, they have ample information that AVA has military 
support from the government to enforce the order. In general, it creates no difficulty for the 
pastoralists to foresee AVA’s power as the latter belongs to the “omnipotent” body- the state. 
Given the above conditions and AVA’s commitment to enforce the order, the best option for 
the local people is to accept AVA’s order.  
This was what happened in Ambash during the establishment of state farms. The 
pastoralists were given an offer, which they couldn’t refuse. They, as customary right holders 
over the rangeland, were neither invited to sign a contract with government officials nor were 
they given the chance to comment on what was going on in their traditional territory. Instead, 
they were given a duty to respect the state property. Although they lost part of their land 
without fair compensation (Getachew 2001), the deprived pastoralists decided to accept 
AVA’s order. As compensatory measures, various pastoral development schemes were 
developed, at the beginning of the plantations, which included, among others, development of 
irrigated pasture and settlement schemes. Huge financial injections were made by the state to 
build irrigation infrastructure for the settlement farms in order to convince the local people. 
The displaced pastoralists were allocated land to cultivate crops while raising livestock. Close 
supervision and material assistance were given to the settlers in order to convert them to 
sedentary farmers. To provide a coordinated assistance for pastoralists in their sedentary 
farming, the Amibara Settlement Project was initiated in 1967. Initially, AVA took the 
responsibility to manage the project whereas later on (in 1980) the Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission (RRC) shared this responsibility. Under the management of both AVA and RRC, 
all costs of the settlement farms were covered by the state functionaries while the settlers 
contributed nothing except their labor. In addition, MAADE provided casual employment for 
clan leaders and other influential people. As a result, these pastoralists could generate benefits 
from crop production8 for the first time in their history. 
The introduction of the settlement farms didn’t contradict with the notion of common 
property regime in this case. Actually, the settlement farms were organized in a system of 
                                                 
8  Cotton and maize were the major crops produced. The cotton was to be sold to a ginning factory for 
processing and the maize was to be consumed. 
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collective farms9 where all plots were managed together and all registered pastoralists shared 
the final outputs. However, the new land use arrangement implied the existence of two 
variants of common property regime. The non-riverine part of the area remained under the 
control of the pastoralists (entirely allocated for livestock grazing) while pastoral customary 
rights were no more de facto in the riverine sites. Putting it another way, the introduction of 
the state brought legal pluralism, to be more specific legal “dualism”, into picture. Claims 
over the riverine sites were governed and protected by statutory laws whereas the non-riverine 
sites remained out of direct state protection and legitimacy.  
Despite its continuing role the state couldn’t support the settlement farms endlessly. Being 
enforced by the acute drought that devastated the whole country, RRC withdrew from the 
management of the settlement project in 1984 while AVA was forced to concentrate on the 
state farms. Consequently, all the technical personnel and farm implements were transferred 
to the state farms that made the settlement farms apparently nonfunctional.  
After the withdrawal of RRC, AVA started to reorganize the settlement farms. In this case, 
the collective settlement farms were subdivided into blocks and given to groups of pastoralists 
organized on kinship basis. The main purpose of this ‘group farm development scheme’ was 
to increase the participation of the pastoralists in the management of the farms and actual 
production. This intervention reduced the group size of communal landowners and put the 
common property regime closer to private property.   
The above explanation indicates how the state through its functionaries influenced the 
direction of property rights and land use arrangements. By the power vested in them, the two 
state functionaries defined and redefined the land use rules without the consent of the 
pastoralists. Some questions may be posed at this point. Were the pastoralists powerless? 
What action did they take to reclaim their rights? Has AVA sustained its power?   
In fact, the pastoralists were not powerless. Their power was mainly attributable to their 
numerousness and the assistance they got from neighboring pastoralists.  Indeed, throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s the local people imposed series of pressure on the administration of the 
state farms. The pastoralists expressed their dissatisfaction and opposition to the 
implementation of the commercial farms schemes mainly by damaging mature crops in the 
field. A typical example could be the recurrent damages caused by local people on banana 
plantation, eventually, which forced the state farms to abandon banana production. The 
resistance was inevitable because the compensatory attempts couldn’t satisfy the pastoralists 
                                                 
9  Of course, this was in line with the socialist mode of production which the government of the time followed.  
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who lost their most valuable heritage. Moreover, the introduced change installed a giant 
barrier to those who had secondary use rights and hence these groups were on a continuous 
motion to reverse the change. Initially, the state farms allocated adequate budget to be paid to 
clan leaders and elders in the form of employment benefits so that they could take care of the 
resistance. This reward system couldn’t stop the resistance partly because of the gradual 
decline of the budget allocated for this purpose.   
It is worthwhile to note that the relative power of the two actors has changed in favor of the 
pastoralists in the course of time. At the beginning, AVA had the power to mobilize resources 
to constrain the choices of the pastoralists. However, it couldn’t maintain the liquidity of its 
power resources to continuously influence (through the reward, punish or reward-punish 
system) the choices of its counterparts. This is partly attributable to the decline of the 
attention of the government towards state-farms after 1989.  Especially after the economic 
reform, following the downfall of the socialist regime in May 1991, the stake of the 
government in business ventures has dramatically declined. Most of state-owned enterprises, 
including state farms, small and medium scale manufacturing industries, and hotels have been 
gradually privatized. As a result, AVA couldn’t get financial and other supports from the 
government to maintain its power. In addition, the shift in the national political structure 
towards ethnic-based federalism and the concomitant establishment of the Afar National 
Regional State calibrated the power balance in favor of the pastoralists.  
This change in power balance has brought some effects on the property right arrangements. 
With the efforts of the Afar regional government and the decision of the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia, MAADE handed over a significant part of its land (with all of its 
irrigation infrastructure and facilities) to the local people10 in 1993.  This, in turn, brought two 
distinct property relations thereby increasing the number of actors. First, the pastoralists 
                                                 
10  The state farms handed over about 6547 ha, with its entire irrigation infrastructure, to local pastoralists in 
1993, which the latter leased to emerging investors (MAADE unpublished document). As realized from 
group discussions, investors pay 30% of their annual profit to pastoralists in the form of rent. The pastoralists 
have formed a standing committee (including an accountant) to monitor all transactions of the investors. The 
committee has been entrusted to defend the rights of their principals and take actions when errors persist. 
However, the capacity of the committee to do so is questionable because the members have no accounting 
knowledge and even some do not read and write. Hence, every thing is done based on trust. In addition to 
financial payments to the pastoralists, the investors have promised to improve local infrastructure including 
schools, watering trenches and health stations. However, the pastoralists complain that none of the investors 
has honored his words regarding infrastructure development. 
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subdivided part of the returned farm and started private farming in collaboration with 
highlanders. In this case, the highlanders are the “tenants” and, due to their rich experience in 
sedentary farming, are responsible for all farm operations, while the Afars are the “landlords” 
who share the final outputs without involvement in farm operations. Second, part of the farm 
was leased-out to investors whereby the latter pay 30% of the net farm incomes to the 
pastoralists.  
In general, continuous changes have been observed in the riverine site of the Middle 
Awash Valley while the non-riverine sites remained under the customary rule. This is because 
of the better resource endowments of the riverine sites that attracted additional actors to 
realize different forms of property rights therein. In addition, the above explanation indicates 
that power is embedded in property right changes and, hence, claimants divert the rules in 
favor of themselves whenever the power balance tilts towards them.   
5.2.1.2 The Role of the State in other Study Sites 
Despite its large stake in property right changes in Ambash, direct state intervention doesn’t 
explain property right changes in other five sites of the study. Rather, these areas are 
characterized by absence of state intervention and marginalization in the realm of economic 
development. Two of the locations, namely Harihammo and Daleti, are quite far (about 35 km 
away) from the main irrigable river (Awash). Even those sites found in the Middle Awash 
Valley (Kurkura, Dudub, and Doho) are not convenient for irrigation given the irrigation 
technology adapted by AVA in Ambash and similar areas. In terms of the payoffs given in 
Table 3, Ycc - Yss < β and hence it is not economically attractive for AVA to propose and 
enforce commercial farms in these five sites. While irrigation seems unattractive in these 
areas, rain-fed agriculture is also precarious to exercise commercial farming.  
The absence (or inappropriate state intervention) could be linked with the nature of the 
political system that generates the decisions. In public choice perspective the central theme is 
the tradeoff that politicians face between economic incentives that favor the implementation 
of a policy and political incentives that favor protection of public interests (Bardhan 2005). In 
democratic systems, where various public interests are reflected in the political arena, 
divergence of policy reforms from public interests may endanger political agents to pursue 
their future political career and economic interests. In such cases political entities have to 
reconcile the economic advantage of promulgating a policy and its political consequences. 
Nevertheless, in undemocratic systems, where the public in question are not represented in the 
political system, the divergence of public interests from policy reforms may be large since 
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political decisions are made mainly on economic grounds or pure ideological motives. This is 
why the imperial government in Ethiopia passed the decree of the 1962, which affected the 
livelihoods of pastoralists in Ambash, without the consent of the latter. In this case, the 
establishment of AVA served two main objectives: the economic objective of generating 
revenue for the state and the ideological objective of transforming pastoralists into sedentary 
farmers. Indeed, economic objective was overriding (Getachew 2001) which Ambash and 
similar areas fulfilled. In the other sites of the study, although launching projects related to 
farming could fulfill the ideological objectives, economic rents could not be anticipated by 
political agents due to non-suitability of these sites for wide-scale irrigated farming.  
5.2.2 Other driving forces of property right changes 
Despite its crucial role, state intervention doesn’t explain the entire process in all of the target 
sites. Rather, individual motivations are quite important in the study areas, which accelerate 
the sub-division of communal lands. While slight inter-site variation may exist the desire for 
farming was found to be high in the study areas. Overall, about 80 percent of the respondents 
required a privately owned plot to start farming.  
The impetus for farming, and hence subdivision of the communal land, is provided by 
livelihood changes and challenges. Firstly, an increasing natural calamities (mainly drought) 
and socioeconomic changes made pastoralists to demand for a more diversified economic 
activities- just as a traditional “portfolio management”. During group discussions pastoralists 
indicated that their livestock-based economy is becoming more volatile nowadays; the 
recurrent droughts and conflicts are mainly to blame. It has been also documented by 
Getachew (2001) that the dwindling yield in the livestock sector pressured pastoralists to have 
additional income sources such as farming, trade and wage employment. Moreover, the 
natural challenges and socioeconomic changes might have triggered changes in food 
consumption patterns among Afar households. Nowadays, most Afar households depend on 
purchased foodstuffs (grains) for a great deal of their subsistence, as access to milk (and also 
meat) has been greatly reduced due to recurrent droughts (and also to some extent livestock 
raids). The expansion of truck-stop towns, increased commercialization, and food-aid (which 
is in the form of grains and supplements), are also among forces those might have contributed 
to change in consumption patterns and the resulting upward shift of demand for grains (and 
other commercial goods). The multifaceted challenges to livestock husbandry and a 
spontaneous shift from dairy-based to grain-based cuisine might have necessitated crop 
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production, in areas where conditions allow doing so, at least to partially fulfill family food 
requirements.  
Secondly, farming has been preferred as a means of stopping the expansion of neighboring 
ethnic groups. Particularly, this strategy is more important for pastoralists in Harihammo and 
Daleti where sedentary farmers from Amhara region are expanding towards the Afar territory 
as a result of population pressure. Elders in Ambash also explicitly expressed their desires to 
start farming in Aleideghi plain where Afars and Issas frequently confront each other. Despite 
their desire to consolidate their former customary rights over their ancestral land, they 
requested to get support from the government; perhaps, the support includes getting external 
legitimacy to have exclusionary rights over this contested rangeland and intervention in case 
coercive intrusion encounters. On the other hand, the demand for sub-division of collective 
holdings implies the influence of state policies on the attitude of pastoralists. That is, since the 
national policies favor sedentary farming, people may apparently advocate the subdivision of 
communal lands as a strategy of getting state legitimacy and support.  
Finally, the growing interest for sub-division of communal land might have some link with 
evolutionary changes in pastoral mode of life. In highly mobile societies, it is difficult to 
implement private property regime because this requires the physical presence of the right 
holder (or associates) to ensure exclusionary and management rights. Three to four decades 
ago, when the clans in the study areas were highly mobile, private ownership was held on 
portable assets such as livestock and weapons while more fixed resources such as land 
remained communal. However, more than any time in the past, Afars are settled now. 
Although there are temporary settlement areas at different corners across their migration 
routes, pastoralists in the study areas have permanent villages (metaro) where part of their 
families reside throughout the year. As these communities become less mobile (or semi-
sedentary), some individuals have started opportunistic farming practices causing the erosion 
of CPR over time.  
While the above explanations give some insights on why pastoralists currently opt for the 
sub-division of part of their collective holdings, this interest doesn’t imply pastoralists’ 
decision to abandon pastoralism. Ironically, about 60% of the sample pastoralists are satisfied 
with their occupation despite all challenges and hence intend to continue with transhumance 
way of life side by side.  
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5.2.3 Reflection of the Changes on Livelihoods 
Property rights imply legitimate access to benefit streams. However, rights alone do not 
guarantee the realization of benefits from resources. In this regard, rights and benefits are 
related but not synonymous. In fact, generation of benefits requires both rights (but not 
always11) and the capability to extract benefits from a resource (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
Benefits are important because individuals, organizations and communities live on them. It is 
the capability to extract benefits from a resource that determine the livelihoods of people and 
rights are important to the extent of capabilities of individuals, organizations and communities 
to generate benefits. In short, rights are less appealing without the capability to exercise them. 
For a person without livestock, for instance, rights to a communal grazing land may be 
meaningless unless he/she has the capability and right to make a different land use 
arrangement. The same applies to a person without farm implements but who has the right to 
till the land.   
While basic natural resources, such as land, can be appropriated in different ways, each 
way of appropriation requires both the right for such type of appropriation and the capability 
to do so. The use of the land for open-grazed animal production requires different property 
right regime to land used for crop production. The two types of land use system also require 
different resources and, hence, capabilities of benefit extraction.  
The change in ways of land appropriation from traditional livestock production to irrigated 
crop production has brought new forms of rights and interactions in the study areas. 
Moreover, the new land use system necessitated the deployment of new resources. Taking the 
case of Ambash, the new resources, embodying the capability to extract benefits, were 
entirely supplied by the state. The irrigation infrastructure and the road network were built by 
the state with a large outlay. Similarly, farm machineries and other facilities were purchased 
by the state. The technical personnel and the management staff were also there by the efforts 
of the state. All of these resources were “packages” required to make the new land use system 
functional in Ambash area. In other words, these resources embody and define capabilities to 
exercise right in the new land use system.  
However, following the withdrawal of RRC from the management of the settlement farms 
all machineries and facilities have been transferred to the state farms, which apparently 
debilitated the capability of the pastoralists to extract benefits from their land.  Lacking the 
knowledge and physical resources needed for farming, the pastoralists couldn’t continue with 
                                                 
11  Access to benefit streams is also possible through illicit means (see also Ribot and Peluso, 2003) 
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crop production despite their enthusiasm to do so. As a result, the entire settlement farm has 
been out of production and is covered, at present, by a non-palatable exotic plant (Prosopis 
juliflora). Moreover, pastoralists are not full beneficiaries of the newly subdivided land 
(reclaimed from the state farm) given the limited capabilities they have to exercise farming by 
their own. Their poor knowledge of farming techniques and lack of other resources enforced 
them to give up to 70 per cent of the net farm proceeds to highlanders. Had the state 
functionaries provided assistance in a way the pastoralists build capabilities to exercise 
farming, the latter could enjoy the full benefits from cultivation.   
The capability to exercise rights is also a barrier in the other study sites. Although 76.7 
percent of the pastoralists have ambitions of mixing pastoralism with crop production (mainly 
because of the existing climatic stress), only 29.7 percent are used to farming. In Daub and 
Kurkura, a few sample respondents had farmland mainly because of the absence of irrigation 
infrastructure. In Doho, some pastoralists started crop production following a small-scale 
irrigation project financed by FAO. Pastoralists in the remaining two sites (Harihamo and 
Daleti) also cultivate crops under unreliable rain-fed condition.  
The fact that irrigation is required to exercise stable farming in all of these sites created an 
environment where capability is more important than rights to derive stable benefits.  
Although the issue of capability can be pronounced in relation to crop production, some 
pastoral households do not have the capability to exercise their rights in line with the 
traditional livestock production system as well. Surprisingly, about 80 percent of the 
pastoralists reported to have less than the minimum livestock holding (~4.5 TLU) required for 
sustaining pastoral livelihoods without supplementary occupations. The low capability in the 
latter case is related to several factors most of which are attributable to weak external support 
(state and NGOs) and recurrent drought.  
The capability issue is also important when it comes to analyzing individual households 
with respect to their access to farmlands. The underlying logic is that heterogeneity exists 
among individuals in their capability to exercise rights. Social identity is one major factor 
attributable to the differences in the capability to exercise rights (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
Indeed, social identity reflected in the form of status (social and economic), gender and, to 
some extent, age has played some role in discriminating households in Ambash against their 
customary right. In this respect, many pastoral households couldn’t generate benefits from 
their communal heritage because of lower capability to exercise their right in line with the 
new production system while others with better capability have benefited from the new 
arrangement. For instance, since the state was found to be a strong enforcer of rights, elites 
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abandoned the customary rules and facilitated their own entitlement to private land. Others 
used their own action resources (such as connections with project leaders or local elites and 
physical fitness12) to acquire farm plots.  
The mistreatment is even worse for women. Women are treated as de facto minors in Afar 
customary laws. They have no ownership right to land as well as other resources, including 
livestock, but are entitled to the benefit streams via their husbands. While about 36% of the 
sample households are beneficiaries, in one way or another, female-headed households derive 
neither pecuniary nor non-pecuniary benefits from the sub-division of communal land. For 
example, women are not considered when the revenue from land lease is annually distributed 
among clan members since the tradition-based criteria exclude female and children from 
consideration. In general, women’s position is precarious because they are forced to lose their 
entitlements to the benefit streams from communal resources as well as household assets after 
the death of their partners or during divorce13. 
Although every clan member is endowed with the communal land and resources embedded 
in it, only those individuals and households with better capability are entitled to generate 
benefits from part of the communal land. To get access to private farmland, the landless 
households may have two options: either to develop a new land for farming or to acquire a 
developed land through any of the access arrangements (e.g. renting or sharecropping) 
available to them. The first option is closer to impossible for these households given their low 
capability to build irrigation infrastructure, which is required to cultivate new land in the 
middle Awash valley. Even if this option is possible, the question of legitimacy may arise for 
using the common-pool resource for private purposes. Getting legitimate access requires the 
approval of the local leaders, again, which is subjected to social identity. In short, although no 
one questions the existence of equal rights for clan member on communal land, everyone’s 
application may not succeed due to capability differences. For instance, about 24 percent of 
the sample respondents perceive that traditional leaders wouldn’t permit them to enclose 
communal pasturage for cultivation. This percentage figure rises to 70 for Ambash where the 
land value is relatively high. Taking per capita livestock ownership as an index of poverty, 
these respondents are poorer (2.2TLU) than those respondents who were confident for getting 
                                                 
12  It has been noted by Getachew (2001) that, the first settlers, who were heavily supported by the government, 
were selected based on physical fitness and ability to communicate with the officials. 
13  For example, when a woman’s husband dies all jointly owned assets including livestock transfer to her 
husband’s family and the widow loses control rights over ‘her’ former resources. In deed, she can take the 
livestock given to her as presents by her husband during their marriage. 
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the approval (3.4TLU). The second option is also less probable given that these deprived 
households have low financial and material capacity as well as poor agricultural knowledge to 
go for renting or sharecropping arrangements.  
6 Conclusion 
Common-pool resources generate livelihoods in many parts of the world particularly in 
pastoral areas of arid and semi-arid tropics. It is also well documented that almost all grazing 
lands in pastoral areas are common-pool resources over which a multitude of pastoral groups 
have de facto rights. Despite this fact, there is a wide range of changes in property rights and 
resource use patterns in these areas nowadays. National governments contributed a lot to the 
change in the customary property rights in many pastoral regions either through direct 
involvement commercial farming or through their policies against the traditional pastoralism 
(Markakis 2004; Ahmed 2001; Ensminger and Rutten 1991).  While the issue of food security 
(through own production) has become an overriding concern in Ethiopia, particularly since 
the 1960s, the strategies of food self sufficiency (mainly under the socialist regime) entailed 
excessive state intervention in pastoral areas in favour of agricultural production which had 
detrimental effects on pastoral livelihoods. 
The following points can be drawn from the experience of state intervention in the study 
areas. First, the actions taken by state were based on the principle that land belongs to the 
state and pastoralists have no right to block the former from using land in a specified way. 
This intention arises partly from the fact that pastoralists are insufficiently organized and not 
represented in the political structure of the country. All state development activities were 
without prior consultation and agreements of the local people whose livelihoods have been 
severely affected by such actions. Such ‘colonial measures’ have inflicted conflicts between 
the state functionaries and the pastoralists who lost their customary rights. Second, the state 
enforced transformation of pastoralism into sedentary farming without building the capacity 
of pastoral households to produce crops. More specifically, the development schemes initiated 
and financed by the state couldn’t enhance the capability of pastoral households so that the 
latter could generate full benefits from their land. Being devoid of public participation, these 
schemes fostered dependency syndrome among pastoralists, which has sustained even after 
their termination.  Third, the state intervention created a window of opportunity for some 
pastoralists while others were deprived. While the customary law entitles every clan member 
to benefit streams from communal land, only a few pastoralists (the elites and their allies) 
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could get access to private plots. Fourth, the role of the state was inconsistent in assisting and 
constraining pastoral livelihoods. More specifically, state development schemes have been 
limited to those areas suitable for commercial farming while areas with low resource 
endowments for agriculture have been deprived of state support. This may magnify the belief 
that the ultimate target of the state was to extract benefits from pastoral resources whereas 
“improving pastoral livelihoods” was a pseudo agenda on the table. Fifth, state development 
interventions might have exacerbated conflicts among various pastoral groups thereby (1) 
worsening scarcity of pastoral resources and (2) excluding pastoral groups who had secondary 
and tertiary rights.  
Despite its crucial role, state intervention doesn’t explain the entire changes in customary 
communal land rights. There are also indications that the individualization process is driven 
by the motives of the pastoralists themselves. Indeed, the impetus for subdivision of the 
communal land is provided by livelihood changes and challenges. The deterioration of 
livestock productivity due to recurrent drought, more settled way of life, and demand for state 
legitimacy for land ownership are among the major factors that have contributed to the desire 
for crop cultivation.  
Finally, many scholars consider that pastoralism is a sustainable way of life under the 
fragile ecological conditions of most dry lands and, hence, should be protected from external 
pressure (Behnke and Scoones 1993; Niamir-Fuller 1999). The so called ‘mobility paradigm,’ 
also supports the notion that extensive, mobile pastoral production can be both sustainable 
and environmentally friendly (Niamir-Fuller 1999). However, empirical contributions show 
that pastoralism is getting weaker in its capability to generate adequate inputs to the survival 
of the people who depend on it (Blench 2001; Markakis 1993; 2004; Ensminger and Rutten 
1991; Helland 2002). Whatever the future of pastoralism may look like, the current accounts 
on pastoralism, altogether, indicates that pastoralism is under pressure coming either from the 
state or from the nature necessitating a careful understanding and action to avert the negative 
consequences of the changes on the livelihoods of pastoralists. This is what the findings of 
this study complement.  
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